Mortgage servicers modified 30,030 troubled loans through the Home Affordable Modification Program in December, only a slight uptick from the month before and still underwhelming to the program's largest watchdog.
The Treasury Department launched HAMP in March 2009 to provide mortgage servicers an incentive to modify mortgages on the verge of foreclosure. The Obama administration set an early goal of reaching between 3 million and 4 million homeowners with the program, but through December 2010, servicers have started 579,659 permanent modifications and offered roughly 1.7 million three-month trials.
Treasury originally set aside roughly $46 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program funds for HAMP, but, according to the Congressional Budget Office, it has spent only $12 billion in payouts to servicers and homeowners.
The Special Inspector General for TARP said in a report released Tuesday that after two years, many of HAMP's goals have been largely unmet.
"It is TARP’s failure to realize its most specific Main Street goal, 'preserving homeownership,' that has had perhaps the most devastating consequences," according to SIGTARP. "Treasury’s central foreclosure prevention effort designed to address that goal — the Home Affordable Modification Program— has been beset by problems from the outset and, despite frequent retooling, continues to fall dramatically short of any meaningful standard of success."
When the program first launched, servicers swept borrowers into trial modifications without gathering the proper financial documentation. What resulted was a backlog of trials lasting more than six months. The Treasury then issued new guidance at the start of 2010 requiring that servicers gather the documentation before moving borrowers into a trial. Conversions into permanent status began to ramp up, increasing 45% since June 2010 and the backlog was pared down to below 40,000 as of December.
Meanwhile servicers say documentation continues to be elusive. ResCap CEO Tom Marano, while speaking at the Mortgage Bankers Association summit last week, said getting the borrower to fill out the necessary financial documents for HAMP is the "biggest friction point" to the program's success.
Still, the Congressional Oversight Panel, another overseer of TARP funds, estimated in December that HAMP would eventually provide between 700,000 and 800,000 permanent modifications.
The Treasury defends the program, highlighting not the eventual numbers but HAMP's ability to provide a nationwide standard for how modifications are to be done.
The private-sector alliance of mortgage servicers, known as Hope Now, completed 82,000 modifications through their proprietary programs in November, more than triple the amount of HAMP mods.
While Treasury has said it lacks any ability to discipline mortgage servicers for their performance in a voluntary program, SIGTARP echoed the frustrations of many with HAMP, even opining as to why regulators issued no punishment for the program's "abysmal" numbers.
"Treasury’s reaction to servicer noncompliance with the requirements of HAMP and its related programs appears to be driven largely by the fear that forcing servicers to comply with their contractual obligations will drive them away from HAMP," SIGTARP said. "Despite nearly daily accounts of errors and more serious misconduct, Treasury reports that it has yet to impose a financial penalty on, or claw back incentives from, a single servicer for any reason other than failure to provide data."
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So, we’re just a week away from the original deadline for the Treasury Department to offer up its bold plan for the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
While a delay is expected, little will likely happen this year to the same government sponsored enterprises that turned the U.S. housing industry from a local partnership between bankers, builders and homebuyers into a global industry that ultimately cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.
Reading the opinions of the various pundits and observers in the trades and around the blogosphere, I can’t shake the feeling that I’m trapped on the set of one of a cable network’s sex in sandals shows. I can almost hear the coliseum crowd from here: death, Death, DEATH!
You can hardly blame the industry. For decades now, mortgage loan originators have been held hostage to companies that told them what they could sell, for what price and with what built-in fees after using what underwriting technology. And then, just to add insult to injury, these same originators were told which loans they had to buy back. Not the kind of partner you wish a long and happy life. And don’t even get me started on their relationships with the nation’s mortgage loan servicers.
I’ve said it before in this space, and at the risk of becoming boring, I feel compelled to point out that something happens to people when they become convinced that they have been trusted to make all the rules for the benefit of those of us who are for whatever reason incapable. It happens in every government agency and soon we’ll see it again with the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. But let’s stay on topic.
GSEs: live or die? Discuss!
Okay, then, what kind of death? It’s not like the industry is ready to attract non-government investors. Until we make it clear that an investor can recover from a borrower who decides to stop making payments, we stand little chance of getting anyone other than the government (i.e. an investor that’s used to spending $10 for every $1 of benefit). This means we’ll still need some vehicle for getting taxpayer money into the hands of good borrowers.
We need someone that has a long history of loaning to borrowers, preferably someone who has worked with borrowers who are a bit risky. Someone like, I don’t know, the Federal Housing Administration.
Okay, I know. This agency has been stretched all out of proportion when it became the de facto subprime lender for the industry. But it didn’t explode, or implode. Delinquencies rose, check engine lights came on, but the agency is still making loans.
Maybe we should throw a few billion into turning FHA into the way the government supports American homeowners. Beats throwing hundreds of millions into legal defense for former, former-GSE executives who are trying to explain in court how their conflict of interest between showing returns and fulfilling a charter sucked billions of dollars down a black hole.
In any event, we may well end up living in a GSE-free world, but our industry will still have a major government-backed investor in the game for a long, long time. I’d love to see your ideas hit my Twitter stream. If I get enough I’ll send them to Treasury for consideration (and throw a few quarters into the town’s wishing well while I’m at it).
Rick Grant is veteran journalist covering mortgage technology and the financial industry.
Follow him on Twitter: @NYRickGrant
Tags: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fannie, Federal Housing Administration, Freddie, GSEs, Treasury Department
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